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Unconventional Fiscal Policy
By Francesco D’Acunto, Daniel Hoang, and Michael Weber∗
Macroeconomists often prefer monetary
policy to fiscal policy as a tool to stabilize
business cycles. Fiscal policy is typically
only effective with a lag, and results in per-
manent deficits with higher nominal inter-
est rates and distortionary taxes. In ad-
dition, a high marginal propensity to save
out of temporary tax cuts might result in
low fiscal multipliers with empirical esti-
mates often below 1 (see Ramey (2011b)
and Barro and Redlick (2011)).1
The zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates, however, constrains the effectiveness
of monetary policy during liquidity traps.
Large stocks of sovereign debt limit the
scope of fiscal stimulus, and inflated cen-
tral bank balance sheets constrain asset-
purchase programs as forms of unconven-
tional monetary policy.2 The unclear ef-
fectiveness of several measures of monetary
policy – both conventional and unconven-
tional – after the 2008-2009 Financial Cri-
sis calls for alternative mechanisms to in-
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Ramey (2011a) and Ramey (2015) review this litera-
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2Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2015) develop a
model in which liquidity traps spread around the world,
and secular stagnation can be the new norm for global
macroeconomic conditions.
crease aggregate demand and hence pro-
mote growth.
This issue is especially relevant for sev-
eral major developed economies that, years
after the end of the Great Recession in the
United States, are still experiencing slug-
gish growth. In particular, southern Eu-
ropean countries are still facing the con-
tractionary effects of the austerity measures
they implemented to abate their debt-to-
GDP ratios during the Euro sovereign-debt
crisis. Many economists argue structural
reforms are necessary to improve the com-
petitiveness of these countries in the long
run, but promoting a short-run increase in
aggregate demand to jump start the econ-
omy is also a compelling objective for policy
makers.
The conundrum the Euro area has faced
since the start of the Great Recession is to
generate inflation and ultimately stimulate
consumption and economic growth in a set-
ting in which traditional monetary policy
measures were not viable and governments
could not generate growth with fiscal stim-
ulus because of their large debt-to-GDP
ratios. This challenge was so compelling
that in his Marjolin lecture on February
4, 2016, the president of the European
Central Bank, Mario Draghi, asserted that
“there are forces in the global economy
that are conspiring to hold inflation down.”
(Draghi, 2016).
I. What Is Unconventional Fiscal
Policy?
In this article, we define and propose pre-
liminary empirical evidence for an alterna-
tive type of policy measure, which we call
unconventional fiscal policy. We define un-
conventional fiscal policies as those policies
that generate an increasing path of con-
sumption taxes that result in households’
higher inflation expectations and negative
real interest rates. Negative real interest
1
2rates can stimulate household consumption,
and result in increased spending, and ulti-
mately higher growth. Thus, the main ob-
jective of unconventional fiscal policies is to
increase households’ inflation expectations
even when conventional monetary policy is
constrained.
Unconventional fiscal policy satisfies the
following criteria:
1. It is time consistent, because it repli-
cates the first-best allocation in a setting in
which lump-sum taxes are available.
2. It does not rely on inefficient policies
such as commitments to keep future interest
rates low or wasteful government spending.
3. It does not rely on income effects,
which might be small.
4. It can be implemented in a budget-
neutral fashion, which is especially relevant
for countries plagued by large debt-to-GDP
ratios.
5. It is a policy measure that is salient
and easy to understand by households.
Theoretical underpinnings for unconven-
tional fiscal policy are in Correia et al.
(2013), who show the use of consumption
taxes can replicate negative real interest
rates and completely offset the zero-lower-
bound constraint on nominal interest rates
in a time-consistent manner. The intuition
for the result is simple. Suppose real inter-
est rates should be negative. Nominal inter-
est rates typically cannot be negative due to
the arbitrage relationship between money
and bonds, and hence the only way to gen-
erate negative real interest rates is higher
inflation. Consumer prices determine the
households’ intertemporal decisions. Imple-
menting an increasing path of future con-
sumption taxes generates consumer price
inflation and negative real interest rates,
which stimulate demand.
If firms set prices in a staggered fash-
ion, additional taxes might be necessary to
achieve a first-best allocation. We might
have to lower labor income taxes to en-
sure consumption taxes do not affect the
intratemporal margin between leisure and
consumption, and hence the real wage. The
constant real wage and the fact that firms’
pricing decisions are independent of the
change in consumption taxes ensures firms
have no incentive to change prices, which
avoids costly price dispersion. Therefore,
the production allocation across firms is ef-
ficient and the government can use taxes
to offset the possible distortions due to
monopoly rents. Under certain conditions,
these policies can replicate the first-best al-
location and are hence time consistent.
Based on the criteria listed above, uncon-
ventional fiscal policy differs markedly from
traditional forms of fiscal policy, such as fis-
cal stimulus and tax rebates. For instance,
traditional measures of fiscal policy are not
budget neutral, but produce higher budget
deficits. Moreover, traditional forms of fis-
cal policy rely heavily on income effects,
which might be small and stimulate only
temporary demand, as the example of the
cash for clunkers program in the United
States demonstrates (see, e.g., Mian and
Sufi (2012)).
Unconventional fiscal policy also differs
markedly from unconventional monetary
policy measures, such as forward guidance,
which also operate through inflation expec-
tations but might be difficult to understand
and actually increase savings because they
might increase uncertainty and induce pre-
cautionary savings.
II. Unconventional Fiscal Policy:
A Case Study
A concrete example of a measure of un-
conventional fiscal policy is the announce-
ment of future value-added tax (VAT) in-
creases. Among the criteria this policy tool
fulfills, the salience of this type of policy
measure to generate inflation expectations
among non-experts, such as households, is
a crucial advantage of unconventional fiscal
policy over unconventional monetary pol-
icy.3
Shapiro (1991), Feldstein (2002), and
Hall (2011) propose pre-announced in-
creases in VAT to generate consumer price
inflation and stimulate spending via in-
tertemporal substitution without increas-
3See D’Acunto et al. (2017) for a discussion of the
relationship between the salience of consumer prices and
inflation expectations.
3ing the federal budget deficit.4
Testing for the effect of unconventional
fiscal policy on households’ consumption
expenditure empirically poses two main
challenges. First, the econometrician needs
to observe households’ consumption plans
in conjunction with a large set of ex-
pectations regarding future personal and
macroeconomic conditions, including infla-
tion expectations. This setup is crucial be-
cause unconventional fiscal policy operates
through households’ inflation expectations
as opposed to channels such as income or
wealth effects.
Second, a generic change in consumption
taxes does not necessarily represent a mea-
sure of unconventional fiscal policy. Vi-
able measures require an exogenous prean-
nouncement of higher future consumption
taxes. The announcement should happen
when nominal interest rates are fixed, so
that higher inflation expectations result in
lower real interest rates, and hence house-
holds’ lower willingness to save. Fixed nom-
inal interest rates can arise if the zero lower
bound binds, or if the central bank does
not necessarily respond to unilateral gov-
ernmental policies, such as in a currency
union.
In this article, we propose Poland as a
case study. We use confidential micro data
from the market research firm GfK. GfK
surveys a representative set of 1,000 Pol-
ish households on a monthly basis to mea-
sure expectations about business-cycle con-
ditions on behalf of the European Commis-
sion. The Polish administration announced
in July 2010 that it would increase the gen-
eral VAT from 22% to 23% and the reduced
rate to 8%. We use the answers to the
questions regarding how consumer prices
will evolve in the next 12 months relative
to the previous 12 months and whether
households think it’s a good time to buy
larger items, such as furniture and elec-
tronic items, given the current economic
conditions, to test for the effect of uncon-
4Feldstein (2002): “This [VAT] tax-induced in-
flation would give households an incentive to spend
sooner rather than waiting until prices are substantially
higher.”
ventional fiscal policy on consumption ex-
penditure.5
Based on a sample from January 2009
through December 2012, Figure 1 docu-
ments a positive time-series correlation be-
tween Polish households’ average inflation
expectations and their willingness to pur-
chase durable goods. The positive cor-
relation is statistically different from zero
throughout the sample period. Its size is
larger after the announcement (July 2010)
and before the actual VAT increase (Jan-
uary 2011).
Figure 1 is consistent with the consump-
tion Euler equation as well as with the po-
tential effectiveness of unconventional fiscal
policy. At the same time, though, this base-
line association is also consistent with alter-
native explanations and channels.6
The ideal experiment would consist of
an exogenous increase in future consump-
tion taxes with no other contemporane-
ous shock. The Polish experiment is thus
far from perfect: (i) the tax change was
not exogenous based on the taxonomy of
Romer and Romer (2010); (ii) the period
of the change coincided with the European
sovereign debt crisis; (iii) the Polish gov-
ernment implemented several contempora-
neous policy changes; (iv) Poland had mon-
etary sovereignty to change nominal inter-
est rates over the period of interest; and (v)
channels other than inflation expectations
might explain our findings, such as income
or wealth effects, redistribution, consumer
uncertainty, or housing-wealth effects.
In addition, all Polish households were
exposed to the same shock. For identifi-
cation, we miss a counterfactual, that is,
a group of households not affected by the
shock but similar to Polish households be-
fore the shock.
In D’Acunto, Hoang and Weber (2018),
we address all these challenges and ex-
ploit a unique natural experiment in Ger-
5See D’Acunto, Hoang and Weber (2018) for the ex-
act wording and variable construction.
6The size and sign of the association between infla-
tion expectations and consumption propensities is still
debated. See, e.g., Bachmann, Berg and Sims (2015),
Burke and Ozdagli (2014), Crump et al. (2015), and
D’Acunto, Hoang and Weber (2018).
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Figure 1. Expected Increase in Inflation and Average Readiness to Spend on Durables
Note: This figure plots average monthly inflation expectations (black solid line, left y-axis) and the average monthly
readiness to purchase durables (red dashed line, right y-axis) over time. We use the confidential micro data underlying
the GfK Consumer Climate survey to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 1,000 households
how consumer prices will evolve in the next 12 months compared to the previous 12 months and whether it is a good
time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. We create a dummy variable that equals 1 when a
household expects inflation to increase. Higher values correspond to better times to purchase durables. The sample
period is January 2009 to December 2012 for a total of four years.
many that fulfills our definition of uncon-
ventional fiscal policy. In November 2005,
the newly formed German government un-
expectedly announced a three-percentage-
point increase in VAT, effective in January
2007.
Two features make this announcement
uniquely suited to test for the effect of
unconventional fiscal policy, compared to
other changes in VAT. First, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) imposed this measure on
the German administration to avoid an in-
fringement procedure for the breach of the
Maastricht Treaty. The VAT increase an-
nouncement was therefore unexpected and
unrelated to expected future economic con-
ditions, which qualifies as an exogenous tax
change due to inherited fiscal deficits in
Romer and Romer (2010). Second, Ger-
many had no monetary sovereignty in 2010.
The European Central Bank excluded ex-
plicitly any increases in nominal interest
rates to counteract the price pressure from
a higher VAT in Germany.
To create a counterfactual, D’Acunto,
Hoang and Weber (2018) proposes a strat-
egy in the spirit of Poterba (1996) and
Besley and Rosen (1999). The empirical de-
sign uses matched households in EU coun-
tries not exposed to the VAT shock as a
counterfactual for German households, in a
difference-in-differences identification strat-
egy.
III. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide preliminary em-
pirical evidence of the effectiveness for a
novel form of stimulus – unconventional fis-
cal policy – that we argue has many desir-
able properties compared to conventional
fiscal policy or unconventional monetary
policy. Pre-announced VAT increases com-
bined with lower income taxes-including
tax credits-would result in a predictable
increase in inflation without inducing un-
certainty. They would increase consumer
spending and hence growth, but would not
lead to higher budget deficits, without af-
fecting the total tax burden of households.
These implications are especially relevant
at times of low inflation and low growth,
paired with the non-viability of conven-
tional measures of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy. Governments could reverse the tax 
changes during normal economic times to
keep the gunpowder dry for potential sub-
sequent economic slumps.
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